‘Bombing the bandit bridge’  Be careful with the people’s bridge

By Klairung Phromsupa

This is a translation of original Thai article https://transbordernews.in.th/home/?p=39566

Throughout the year, complaints about human trafficking have increased as Thailand shifts from being a destination country for human trafficking from Burma/Myanmar to becoming both a source and transit country into Myanmar. These concerns have often been dismissed with the explanation that the crimes are part of other countries’ gray business empires and that Thai officials lack the authority to cross the border to assist the hundreds of thousands of victims. Therefore, there is little the Thai state can do.

The government’s primary measures focus on the most uncomplicated ones: cutting off electricity and internet access from Thailand. This approach aligns with the proposal of the House of Representatives’ Committee on State Security, Border Affairs, National Strategy, and Reform, which conducted a visiting trip to Mae Sot District in Tak Province the following month.

The operation to cut off internet access, part of the ‘Bombing the Bandits’ Bridge’ initiative, targeted signal poles, cables, and SIM cards. This involved taking control of or readjusting signal poles that previously faced neighboring countries to weaken the signal and cutting fiber optic cables that had been extended across the border. Examples include cables running from a village in Mae Sot District, Tak Province, to Myawaddy Town in Karen State (June) and from Santisuk Village in Mae Chan District, Chiang Rai Province, to the Wa Army (UWSA) base in Shan State, a location notorious for its ties to drugs and illicit activities (July).

However, when obstacles arose with internet access from Thai service providers, criminal networks quickly adapted, much like having a contingency plan for power outages in Thailand.  Besides turning to Mytel, a Myanmar military and Vietnamese internet provider with inconsistent service, ‘Starlink,’ SpaceX’s high-speed satellite internet, has become increasingly popular.

As a result, Starlink kits, set to go on sale in 2022 and are used in hundreds of countries worldwide, risk being labeled as ‘pirate’ in Thailand if the NBTC does not reach an agreement with SpaceX and permit their use.

The crackdown on Starlink began around April 2024, as the device was deemed to violate the Telecommunications Business Act due to its lack of customs clearance, even though the Starlink sets were only transiting through Thailand to neighboring countries and were not intended for use within Thailand. The Technology Crime Suppression Center (TCSD) reported success in seizing hundreds of Starlink sets and arresting individuals from various nationalities involved in the operations over the past few months. However, the scammer network appeared undeterred, rapidly establishing new business hubs around the Myawaddy border opposite Mae Sot District, Tak Province, and extending their activities to Phop Phra District and further south to Phaya Thonsu  near the Three Pagodas Pass in Kanchanaburi Province. The network in the southern region near Koh Song opposite Ranong Province has also been growing steadily.

In reality, cutting off electricity and internet access is only a temporary measure that might disrupt criminal networks but often complicates their operations further. The effects of such actions are likely to be short-lived unless the government implements additional measures. Many have proposed tackling the issue by dismantling the networks involved in benefiting from and laundering money, cracking down on the recruitment of scammers along the Thai border, and enforcing stricter controls on human trafficking, as well as regulating the entry and exit of individuals of all nationalities through checkpoints and crossing ports, many of whom are known to work in these criminal enterprises.

Importantly, in an era when the Myanmar military government cannot effectively govern the border areas, negotiations, coordination, or requests for cooperation will likely be more successful with the Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and armed groups in the region rather than with the Burmese military itself.

While scammers with financial resources and extensive networks can quickly rebuild the ‘bridge’ that was destroyed, efforts to block internet access have severe repercussions for the general public, including ethnic villagers, media networks, human rights defenders, and democracy activists from Myanmar. The internet is not just a tool for criminals but also a vital resource in the fight for democracy and the survival of the people with dignity.

Border ethnic communities have long relied on Thai internet and phone services. Villagers note that Thai internet is of higher quality and that Thai providers offer more favorable promotions than Myanmar companies’ services, which often neglect remote forests and mountainous areas. Even city dwellers with access to Myanmar internet frequently prefer Thai SIM cards. Those who rely on Myanmar networks like Mytel, MPT, and Ooredoo usually live farther from the border, where Thai internet coverage does not reach. However, after the coup, the Myanmar military cut off internet access in areas controlled by ethnic groups. Border ethnic communities then experienced further disruptions when the Thai government cut off internet signals across the border. This has made Starlink an essential lifeline.

“We import Starlink through Thailand because we need internet access in schools and hospitals for online education, to stay informed about the country and the world, and even to watch movies and listen to music like everyone else. Civil society organizations involved in development and humanitarian assistance rely on the Internet for communication and information. The internet is neither a luxury nor a dangerous weapon,” explained a member of a civil society group in response to news of Starlink seizures and arrests.

When internet access was needed in conflict zones and ethnic areas, a network of activists and civilians opposed to Myanmar military coup stepped in to help order or transport equipment across the border. While initial arrests may have involved individuals suspected of being linked to the Chinese gray crime empire’s scam operations—such as packages from Taiwan with Chinese recipients or shippers—subsequent tracking of Starlink orders has led to the arrest of several members of civil society organizations and human rights defenders from Myanmar. Some of these individuals fled persecution into the country without proper documents and have been prosecuted under the Immigration Act.

The operation to bomb the bandit bridge has morphed into a bomb dropping on the people’s bridge. Civil society and human rights defenders within the government sector have doubled their efforts to prevent activists involved in the Starlink case from being deported back to their country, where their lives would be at risk. Starlink, once just an internet device, has now been deemed ‘illegal,’ with its price steadily increasing due to rising transportation costs. Simply securing internet access in the community has become an ordeal fraught with unbelievable risks and stress.

A Karenni revolutionary leader stated that while the Karenni must fight the struggle on their own and did not wish to ask much from anyone, he would like to request the Thai government not to cut off communication between the people and the outside world. The internet should not be seen as a tool of war or political conflict; it is vital for the survival of the people. Providing Starlink equipment to Karenni areas does not threaten Thailand’s security—it enhances human security in the region.

In a world where digital rights are increasingly recognized as human rights—including freedom of expression, the right to privacy, security, and access to digital space—the internet is essential for information, education, and vital social services. The act of cutting off cross-border internet access must be carefully weighed against the collateral damage it causes, which should never be accepted as usual.

To effectively combat criminal networks, the Thai government must implement the additional measures proposed above in parallel. The ‘Bombing the Thieves’ Bridges’ approach may continue, but only if the government is mindful, understands the implications, and is committed to preserving the people’s bridges.

Crucially, Starlink must not be weaponized against exile human rights defenders. Whether or not an agreement with SpaceX is reached, legal policies that recognize and protect all refugees and those living in exile must be established urgently.