By Paskorn Jumlongrach
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing received a remarkable honor from Beijing during his participation at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit. This underscored China’s decisive choice to fully align with the Myanmar junta leader, disregarding the sentiments of ASEAN and other neighboring countries. National interest comes first for Beijing.
Alongside endorsement from Chinese leadership, Min Aung Hlaing also held bilateral talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Both China and India have expressed support for Myanmar’s planned elections in December 2025—a move that effectively legitimizes Min Aung Hlaing and the military regime.
Of particular significance is cooperation in the rare earth sector. Myanmar holds vast reserves of Rare Earth Elements (REEs), resources Min Aung Hlaing knows are desperately sought by global powers. Rare earths in Kachin and Shan States have thus become a powerful bargaining tool.
In Kachin State, most REE mining areas are controlled by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). While the extracted minerals are sold mainly to China, relations between Beijing and the KIA are strained. China continues to arm the junta against ethnic forces, pushing the KIA to look toward India as an alternative buyer.
Meanwhile in Shan State, rare earth mining is under the control of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). Both forces maintain strong ties with China due to geographic proximity and shared ethnicity. This explains Beijing’s denial to Thai authorities that “Chinese businesses” are not operating in southern Shan—because many of these operators are Chinese nationals holding Myanmar citizenship through the Special Regions of Wa and Mong La.
China and Russia’s supply of arms and funding has enabled Myanmar’s military to launch rapid offensives against ethnic armed organizations and the People’s Defence Force (PDF). In northern Shan, Beijing has pressured the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) via the UWSA to return captured territories to the junta. Simultaneously, China has provided the Myanmar military with advanced weaponry, particularly drones. When Beijing also seized assets of Wa leaders inside China, the UWSA was forced to suspend its support, with Wa leaders lamenting it as the most difficult period in decades.
On Thailand’s western frontier, China has cultivated close relations with the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF) led by Colonel Chit Tu. This is evident in the large-scale repatriation of Chinese nationals—both mafia figures and scam victims—via Mae Sot airport over recent years, coordinated with the BGF. Chinese investors dominate projects in Shwe Kokko and KK Park, hubs of illicit activity. The survival of these enclaves, even amid heavy clashes between the junta and the Karen National Union (KNU) over Myawaddy, is not only due to Colonel Chit Tu’s maneuvering but also to China’s protective influence.
The persistence of scams and the mass detention of foreigners and victims in these areas reflects collusion among all parties—including Thai officials and politicians—profiting from the black economy.
Now, the Myanmar military has fully captured Myawaddy. The BGF has shifted into Myanmar military uniforms and is preparing to rebrand as the Karen National Army (KNA) to consolidate control over both legal and illicit businesses while distancing themselves from direct junta affiliation.
This raises serious concerns for Thailand’s western border. The KNU and allied forces once sought control of the frontier, but today the junta benefits from new supplies by China and Russia. Russia, in particular, plans to establish military influence in Dawei under the guise of a nuclear power plant, a project the junta welcomes for its strategic leverage.
Conflict has now reached the Thai–Karen border, and a major battle looms. Thailand has already squandered its best opportunities to secure its frontier due to weak policy and leadership. The country is left only to manage the immediate fallout.
From the north, millions of Thai citizens suffer daily from transboundary pollution from mining that creates contamination in the Mekong and tributaries, narcotics trafficking, and armed incursions from Wa-controlled territories. Yet Thai security forces have allowed non-state armed groups to operate with impunity, failing to protect the population. The root causes remain corruption and the sharing of illicit benefits.
Looking west, Russia’s proposed nuclear facility in Dawei—just across from Kanchanaburi—poses new risks to Thai national security, while China continues to expand its economic and political footprint from Tak to Ranong. These frontier zones remain vulnerable to exploitation by opportunists, aided by Myanmar’s failed state governance.
Meanwhile, Thailand’s politicians are consumed by internal power struggles, leaving the nation without a coherent border strategy. If we cannot even begin to craft a proper border policy today, it is uncertain whether Thailand will retain the national dignity needed to negotiate with regional powers tomorrow.
This is a translation of original Thai article https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=1402407998556671&set=a.504230305041116